The workshop speakers:

Franz Dietrich, Maastricht University (homepage):

The Possibility Space in Collective Decision Making -Explored with Judgment Aggregation

This talk is intended to give an overview on recent developments in the field of judgment aggregation. The talk is based on different papers, many of which are joint work with Christian List (London School of Economics). See in particular:

A generalised model of judgment aggregation, October 2004     pdf file

The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation (with Christian List), September 2005     pdf file

Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation (with Christian List), April 2005     pdf file

For more information, see my homepage or the following online bibliography on judgment aggregation  link.

Lars Ehlers, Université de Montréal (homepage):

Respecting Priorities when Assigning Students to Schools    pdf file

Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, CORE and Universidad de Málaga (homepage):

Progressivity, Inequality Reduction, and Merging Proofness in Taxation    pdf file

by Biung-Ghi Ju (Department of Economics, The University of Kansas) and Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (CORE, Universite Catholique de Louvain)
 

 William Thomson, University of Rochester (homepage):

On Borrowing Proofness

Giacomo Valletta, CORE:

Fair Solutions to the Compensation Problem    pdf file

John Weymark, Vanderbilt University (homepage):

Consistent Measures of Individual Welfare Change for Expected Utility Maximizers

by Charles Blackorby (University of Warwick), David Donaldson (University of British Columbia), and John A. Weymark (Vanderbilt University)

 This article considers measures of individual welfare change for projects that change the state distribution of prices and incomes.  For a consumer whose preferences satisfy the expected utility hypothesis, we investigate if there is an increasing function of the state-contingent compensating variations that is positive valued if and only if a project makes the consumer better off ex ante when income and some subset (possibly all) of the prices are permitted to vary across states.  We show that any such measure of individual welfare change must rank projects by their expected compensating variation and that the indirect utility function that the consumer uses to evaluate prices and income in each state must have the Gorman polar form. We also show that the weight on the state-contingent income in this Gorman polar form can only depend on those prices that do not change across states.  If all prices are uncertain, this restriction on the Gorman polar form is incompatible with it being an indirect utility function and, hence, we obtain an impossibility result.