Course on Epistemic Game Theory

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Background

I have developed a course on epistemic game theory, which is suitable for third-year bachelor students, master students, PhD students, and researchers who are interested in game theory. The course in based on the book "Epistemic Game Theory: Reasoning and Choice" which I have written, and which has been published in 2012 by Cambridge University Press.

This full course has grown out of a mini-course on epistemic game theory, which I have given at the following places so far:

bulletMax-Planck Institute at Jena (Germany), Strategic Interaction Group, May 8th and May 9th 2007.
bulletMaastricht University (The Netherlands), May 15th and May 16th 2007.
bulletUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economics, November 8th and November 9th 2007.
bulletUniversity of Amsterdam (The Netherlands), Institute for Logic, Linguistic, and Computation. February 2008 until April 2008.
bulletLausanne (Switzerland), at the Second Annual Meeting of the Swiss Graduate Society of Logic and Philosophy of Science, June 17th and June 18th 2008.
bulletUniversity of Aarhus (Denmark), Center for Algorithmic Game Theory, April 15th, 16th and 17th 2009. 
bulletErasmus University Rotterdam (The Netherlands), February 1st and 2nd, 2012.

The slides for that mini-course can be downloaded here: Lecture 1   Lecture 2   Lecture 3   Lecture 4

The course has very much benefitted from the people who followed these mini-courses, and provided me with important feedback.

I have given the course for the first time in 2010, together with my dear friend and colleague Christian Bach. Subsequently, we offered the course in 2011 and 2012. So, now it will be the fourth time we give the seven week course at Maastricht University,

Contents, lecture slides, and video recordings of the course

Below you can view and download the lecture slides of the seven-week course Epistemic Game Theory. In 2013 we are also recording the lectures of that course. I post the video-recordings of these lectures below. At this moment, these video-recordings can only be viewed by students at Maastricht University. However, soon we will make these video-recordings accessible to all people all over the world. The idea will be to offer this course also as an online course in the near future.

Part I : Standard Beliefs in Static Games

Common Belief in Rationality  (Based on Chapters 2 and 3 of my book)
Slides
Video Lecture 1
   Video Lecture 2          
What is game theory about
Example: Where to locate my pub
Example: Going to a party
Choosing rationally
Belief hierarchies
Epistemic model
Common belief in rationality
Existence
Algorithm

Simple Belief Hierarchies  (Based on Chapter 4 of my book)
Slides

Video Lecture 3    Video Lecture 4 (In video lecture 4 there is no sound during the first half of the lecture. We apologize for this.)
Simple belief hierarchies
Nash equilibrium
Computational method
Belief that Opponents Hold Correct Beliefs
 

Part II : Lexicographic Beliefs in Static Games

Primary Belief in the Opponent's Rationality  (Based on Chapter 5 of my book)
Slides

Video lecture 5     Video Lecture 6
Cautious reasoning about the opponent
Lexicographic beliefs
Belief hierarchies and types
Cautious types
Primary belief in the opponent's rationality
Common full belief in "primary belief in rationality"
Existence
Weakly dominated choices
Algorithm

Respecting the Opponent's Preferences  (Based on Chapter 6 of my book)
Slides

Video lecture 7       Video Lecture 8
Respecting the opponent's preferences
Common full belief in "respect of preferences"
Existence
Why elimination of choices does not work
Preference restrictions and likelihood orderings
Algorithm

Assuming the Opponent's Rationality  (Based on Chapter 7 of my book)
Slides

                                   Video lecture 10
Assuming the opponent's rationality
 Common assumption of rationality
Algorithm

Part III: Conditional Beliefs in Dynamic Games

Belief in the Opponents' Future Rationality (Based on Chapter 8 of my book)
Slides
Belief revision
Dynamic games
Conditional beliefs
Epistemic model
Common belief in future rationality
Algorithm
Backwards order of elimination
Backward induction

Strong Belief in the Opponents' Rationality (Based on Chapter 9 of my book)
Slides
Strong belief in the opponents' rationality
Common strong belief in rationality
Algorithm
Comparison with backward dominance procedure