Background
I have developed a
course on epistemic game theory, which is
suitable for third-year bachelor students, master students, PhD
students, and researchers who are interested in game theory. The course
in based on the book
"Epistemic Game Theory: Reasoning and Choice" which I
have written, and which will be published in
2012 by
Cambridge University Press.
This full course has grown out of a
mini-course on epistemic game theory, which
I have given at the following places so far:
 | Max-Planck Institute at Jena
(Germany), Strategic
Interaction Group, May 8th and May 9th 2007. |
 | Maastricht University
(The Netherlands), May 15th and May
16th 2007. |
 | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
(Spain),
Department of Economics, November 8th and November 9th 2007.
|
 | University of Amsterdam
(The Netherlands),
Institute for Logic,
Linguistic, and Computation. February 2008 until April 2008.
|
 | Lausanne
(Switzerland),
at the Second Annual Meeting of the Swiss Graduate Society of Logic and
Philosophy of Science, June 17th and June 18th 2008. |
 | University of Aarhus
(Denmark), Center
for Algorithmic Game Theory, April 15th, 16th and 17th 2009.
|
 | Erasmus University Rotterdam (The Netherlands),
February 1st and 2nd, 2012. |
The slides for that
mini-course can be downloaded here:
Lecture 1
Lecture 2
Lecture 3
Lecture 4
The course has very much
benefitted from the people who followed these mini-courses, and provided
me with important feedback.
In
April and May 2010, I have been teaching
the full course for the first time. I have given it as a seven week
course at Maastricht University, together with
Christian Bach. This course was open
for Master students, PhD students, and researchers. Every week I gave two lectures of two hours, and Christian Bach discussed some
exercises every week. During each week we discussed one chapter of the
book
"Epistemic Game Theory: Reasoning and Choice" , and the
last week was
reserved for questions and discussions. The lecture slides can be downloaded below.
In
2011, Christian Bach and I have given
the course again at Maastricht University, between
April 18th and June 1st, 2011. That time,
we treated all chapters of the book, except chapter 7. So, compared
to 2010 we treated two new chapters, namely Chapters 8 and 9,
which are about dynamic games.
In the spring of 2012, Christian Bach and I
will again give the course in Maastricht, but now with the official
title Epistemic Game Theory. The course is
open for master students, PhD students and
interested researchers. In 2012, we will
treat all chapters from the book. In week 1, we combine Chapters 2
and 3.
Contents and lecture slides
of the course
Below you
can view and download the lecture slides of my course
Epistemic Game Theory.
Part I : Standard
Beliefs in Static Games
Common belief in rationality
(Based on Chapters 2
and 3 of my book)
What is game theory about
Example: Where to locate my pub
Example: Going to a party
Choosing rationally
Belief hierarchies
Epistemic model
Common belief in rationality
Existence
Algorithm
Simple Belief Hierarchies
(Based on Chapter 4 of my book)
Simple belief hierarchies
Nash equilibrium
Computational method
Belief that Opponents Hold Correct Beliefs
Part II :
Lexicographic Beliefs in Static Games
Primary belief in the opponent's rationality
(Based on Chapter 5 of my book)
Cautious reasoning about the opponent
Lexicographic beliefs
Belief hierarchies and types
Cautious types
Primary belief in the opponent's rationality
Common full belief in "primary belief in rationality"
Existence
Weakly dominated choices
Algorithm
Respecting the opponent's preferences
(Based on Chapter 6 of my book)
Respecting the opponent's preferences
Common full belief in "respect of preferences"
Existence
Why elimination of choices does not work
Preference restrictions and likelihood orderings
Algorithm
Assuming the opponent's rationality
(Based on Chapter 7 of my book)
Assuming the opponent's rationality
Common assumption of rationality
Algorithm
Part III:
Conditional Beliefs in Dynamic Games
Belief in the opponents' future rationality
(Based on Chapter 8 of my book)
Belief revision
Dynamic games
Conditional beliefs
Epistemic model
Common belief in future rationality
Algorithm
Backwards order of elimination
Backward induction
Strong belief
in the opponents' rationality (Based on Chapter 9 of my book)
Strong belief in the opponents' rationality
Common strong belief in rationality
Algorithm
Comparison with backward dominance procedure